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WHERE THE COURT FAILED
Vito John Marzano*
ABSTRACT
The European Court of Human Rights revisited the issue
of legal recognition for same-sex partnerships on July 21, 2015
when it decided Oliari and Others v. Italy. This Note explores
the implications of that decision and what it may mean for samesex couples within Italy and throughout the Council of Europe.
Through a careful analysis of the decision, this Note concludes
that Oliari provides slight yet important movement on the issue
of a Contracting State’s obligation to afford legal recognition for
same-sex partnerships, but a practical implementation of the
Court’s holding likely will yield little additional movement in
more conservative Contracting States, as the factors utilized to
find a violation on the part of Italy remain highly unique to the
Italian experience, rendering any perception of a victory as
merely psychological in nature.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2016, the Fourth Section of the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)1 issued its decision in Oliari
and Others v. Italy,2 holding that while Italy had a positive
obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR,” the “Convention”) to offer same-sex couples civil
unions, or some type of partnership recognition, the Convention
did not require Contracting States to recognize same-sex
marriage.3
The decision held that it remains within a Contracting
State’s margin of appreciation to deny marriage to same-sex
couples.4 Importantly, however, the Fourth Section expanded
the factors that may be considered for the ECtHR to place a
positive obligation on a Contracting State to provide some legal
partnership recognition.5
In Part I, this Note develops the Court’s application and
interpretation of the Convention in regards to LGBT rights.6
Further, Part I analyzes Schalk and Kopf v. Austria7 and

1 The European Court of Human Rights is composed of five sections, that
each include a President, Vice President, and judges. Further, the ECtHR
divides itself up into judicial formations, which are: Single Judge, Committee,
Chamber, and Grand Chamber. International Justice Resource Center,
European Court of Human Rights, http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-court-ofhuman-rights/ (last visited Feb 1, 2017). When possible, this Note identifies
the judicial formation that issued a particular decision.
2 Oliari and Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11 & 36030/11, Eur. Ct.
H.R., (July 21, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156265.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 As this Note explains, an opposite-gender couple consisting of a male
and a female, regardless if one of those partners is a trans-man or transwoman, are entitled to State-recognized marriage provided that posttransition, the couple consists of two individuals of the opposite gender.
Instances where a couple is made up of a transgender individual but the
transgender individual is the same gender as the other spouse fall within the
scope of same-sex partnerships. To avoid confusion, this Note uses “LGB” in
lieu of “LGBT” when appropriate. This usage does not seek to undermine the
position of transgender individuals in the LGBT community-at-large.
7 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.
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Vallianatos and others v. Greece,8 which established the
foundation for Oliari.
Part II explores Oliari and Others v. Italy’s use of margin
of appreciation, consensus analysis, and the living instrument
document. In so doing, Part II seeks to pinpoint potential
movement by the Court on the issue of same-sex partnerships.
Part III addresses post-Oliari developments.
This Note draws the following conclusions: (1) the Court
is likely not to find a right to marry for same-sex couples in the
foreseeable future; (2) although the Court found that Italy had a
positive obligation to provide same-sex couples with partnership
benefits, the decision is extremely narrow and likely only applies
to the Italian circumstance; and (3) the holding failed to identify
what that State is actually required to offer same-sex couples in
the event it must offer same-sex partnership recognition.
I.

BACKGROUND

Within the Council of Europe, same-sex couples enjoy the
right to marry in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (England, Wales, and
Scotland).9 Same-sex couples may enter into civil partnerships
(e.g., civil unions, domestic partnerships, unregistered
partnership benefits, or any variation thereof) in Andorra,
Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Malta, Northern Ireland, Slovenia, and
Switzerland.10 Outside of the Council of Europe, same-sex
couples enjoy the right to marry, in whole or in part, in
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Greenland, Mexico, New
Zealand, South Africa, Uruguay, and the United States.11
Vallianatos and others v. Greece, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H. R. 125.
See Michael Lipka, Where Europe Stands on Gay Marriage and Civil
Unions, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 9, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org /facttank/2015/06/09/where-europe-stands-on-gay-marriage-and-civil-unions/.
10 See id.
11 Amarendra Bhushan Dhiraj, List of Countries Where Same-Sex
Marriage Is Legal, CEOWORLD MAGAZINE (Apr. 10, 2016), http://ceoworld.biz/
2015/11/23/list-of-countries-where-same-sex-marriage-is-legal;
Colombia’s
highest court paves way for same-sex marriage, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 8, 2016, 9:24
8
9

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/4

4

VITO J MARZANO - OLIARI (DO NOT DELETE)

254

PACE INT’L L. REV.

10/27/2017 2:27 PM

[Vol. 29:1

Finally, Chile and Ecuador provide same-sex couples with civil
unions.12
a. Procedures and Functions of the
European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights employs some
procedures that may seem alien to a U.S.-based audience. To
better understand the decision in Oliari, one must possess a
preliminary understanding of some of these doctrines.
First, it is important to consider that the European Court
of Human Rights exists pursuant to Article 19 of the European
Convention on Human Rights as an international tribunal for
the purpose of interpreting the Convention.13 While the Court
may look to domestic courts for insight, it must confine its
holdings to the limitations set forth in the Convention and
within the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.14 Nevertheless, although the Convention speaks to the
procedure for a private party to challenge a contracting State’s
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/08/colombias-highest-courtpaves-way-for-same-sex-marriage/.
12 Chile’s same-sex couples celebrate civil unions: ‘History changes today’,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2015, 1:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/oct/22/chiles-same-sex-couples-celebrate-civil-unions; Michael K.
Lavers, Ecuadorian lawmakers approve civil unions bill, WASHINGTON BLADE
(Apr. 23, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/04/23/
ecuadorian-lawmakers-approve-civil-unions-bill/.
13 European Convention on Human Rights as amended by Protocols Nos.
11 and 14 art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter “ECHR”].
14 European Court of Human Rights, Bringing a Case to the European
Court of Human Rights: A Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, ¶ 382
(2014) (“Despite its distinctive nature, the Convention remains an
international treaty which obeys the same rules as other inter-State treaties,
in particular those laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The Court cannot therefore overstep the boundaries of the general powers
which the Contracting States, of their sovereign will, have delegated to it.”)
[hereinafter “Bringing a Case”]. The source of authority plays a key role in the
inherent difference between the ECtHR and national tribunals, such as the
Supreme Court of the United States, which derives its authority from Article
III of the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, while the ECtHR must adhere to a
different set of standards when it interprets the Convention, certain doctrines
have evolved that share analogous counterparts to the U.S. Supreme Court.
When possible, this Note identifies those analogous doctrines or practices to
U.S. counterparts.

5
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action (or inaction), the Court has developed extensive
jurisprudence in regards to the application of that procedure. As
this Note demonstrates, the Court’s application of that
procedure can directly impact the interpretation of its holding.
Article 34 of the Convention permits an individual
applicant to bring a claim against a Contracting State for alleged
violations of the Convention, but Article 35 governs the initial
procedural step, which requires the applicant to overcome the
hurdle of admissibility.15 However, to determine admissibility,
the Court must conduct a prima facie examination of the merits,
and, in so doing, will generally provide reasoning as to why it
may find an application “manifestly ill-founded,” and therefore,
inadmissible.16 As explored below, that evolution of the Court’s
reasoning on admissibility as it concerns the rights of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals (“LGBT”) under the
Convention furnishes one with insight on how the Court may
rule on subsequent applications.
Once an application clears the procedural aspect of
Article 35, the application must then undergo a thorough
examination of the claims and determine whether the
Contracting State did indeed violate, and the extent to which the
State may continue to violate, an enumerated right of the

ECHR, supra note 13, art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications
from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties
of the rights set forth in the Convention or Protocols thereto. The High
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise
of this right.”); Id. art. 35 (requiring the Court to dismiss any application that
failed to exhaust all domestic remedies, is incompatible with a provision, or
that is manifestly ill-founded).
16 Id. art. 35(3)(a); BRINGING A CASE, supra note 14, ¶375 (“It is true that
the use of the term “manifestly” … may cause confusion … [I]t is clear from the
settled and abundant case-law of the Convention institutions … that the
expression is to be construed more broadly, in terms of the final outcome of the
case. [A]ny application will be considered ‘manifestly ill-founded’ if a
preliminary examination of its substance does not disclose any appearance of
a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.”). Put another way,
manifestly ill-founded may indicate a prima facie declaration that the case is
inadmissible, the Court’s broad method requires it to look beyond the four
corners of the application to the ultimate outcome to determine its
admissibility.
15
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ECHR.17 Hence, the Court measures a Contracting State’s
“margin of appreciation,” or the spectrum upon which a State
may interfere with an individual’s right.18 To aid in its
determination, the ECtHR must undertake a consensus
analysis, which requires the Court to identify a crystalized
consensus among the Contracting States on the issue.19 Further,
Bringing a Case, supra note 14, ¶ 367 (To determine if a State has
made a permissible interference into the rights enumerated in the Convention,
the Court requires the State to affirmatively meet three criteria: “(1) Was the
interference in accordance with a “law” that was sufficiently accessible and
foreseeable; (2) If so, did it pursue at least one of the “legitimate aims” which
are exhaustively enumerated; and (3) if that is the case, was the interference
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim? In other
words, was there a relationship of proportionality between the aim and the
restriction in issue?”).
18 See Id. ¶ 335; see also PAUL JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69 (2013) (to determine the margin of
appreciation, the Court examines the legality, legitimacy, and necessity of the
restriction relative to the personal interest of the applicant) (hereinafter
“HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT”); PHILIP LEACH, TAKE A CASE TO
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 5.11 (2011) (stating that the specific
issue before the Court will influence the breadth of a State’s margin of
appreciation, and that in contentious controversies, a State enjoys a broad
latitude to interfere with the personal interest) [hereinafter “TAKING A CASE”];
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT, at 68 (identifying that this
inherently presents one with no clear outline as to how wide or narrow a State’s
margin of appreciation is, as the Court, in many instances, provides little legal
justification for its reasoning); Id. at 69-70 (stating that some argue that this
indicates that the margin of appreciation provides insight into the moral
compass of the Court). One can analogize the concept of margin of appreciation
to the U.S. application of judicial review. For instance, strict scrutiny requires
the government to have a compelling interest to regulate the behavior, that the
law is narrowly tailored, and it is the least restrictive means to achieve that
result. Bret Snider, Challenging Laws: 3 Levels of Scrutiny Explained,
FINDLAW (Jan. 27. 2014, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2014/
01/challenging-laws-3-levels-of-scrutiny-explained.html. While the means may
differ between the U.S. Courts and the ECtHR, the goal is the same – to
determine the extent to which the government may interfere in an individual’s
respective rights. I did not feel it necessary to reinvent the wheel in my
exploration of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as related to LGBT rights, hence
I rely heavily on the thoroughly researched and readily available book by Paul
Johnson, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
19 HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT, supra note 18, at 77
(stating that the Court will look to legal development among contracting
States, expert opinions, public opinion both within the individual States and
across the Council of Europe). But see id. at 77–78 ("Consensus analysis is a
17
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the Court adheres to the living instrument interpretation within
the framework of contemporary circumstances, which means
that the vicissitudes of an issue permit an updated
interpretation of the Convention.20 In instances where a
Contracting State acts outside its margin of appreciation as
identified by the ECtHR, a contracting State must modify the
law to adhere to the Court’s determination and cease offending
that particular right. However, in some instances, the failure to
affirmatively act to protect a right may constitute a violation of
the ECHR, which will require the ECtHR to place a positive
obligation on the Contracting State to act to prevent further
interference.21

construct through which the Court legitimizes its moral interpretation and
because of this, … its use is unpredictable and variable. The Court's case law
on homosexuality shows a highly capricious and frequently contested use of
statutory, expert, and public consensus analysis… [T]he use … varies to such
an extent that it cannot be regarded as causally determinative of the margin
in any straightforward way."). The Supreme Court of the United States has
not specifically identified this doctrine, but has undertaken similar analyses.
See e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (noting that twenty-four
states had anti-sodomy laws and using that rationale as a factor in upholding
the constitutionality of said laws); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003)
(acknowledging that the number of states that maintained anti-sodomy laws
since Bowers had dwindled to thirteen, with only four enforcing them solely
against homosexuals and finding those remaining laws unconstitutional);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967) (noting that Virginia was only one of
sixteen states that still maintained miscegenation laws at the time of the suit)
for instances where the Supreme Court of the United States utilized a
consensus analysis. The ECtHR does not exist in a vacuum and will often look
to the reasoning and holding of non-Convention tribunals to inform it of
international movement on a particular issue.
20 TAKING A CASE, supra note 18, at § 5.13 ("[T]he role of the Court is to
interpret the Convention in the light of present day conditions and situations,
rather than to try to assess what was intended by the original drafts of the
Convention in the late 1940s."). This does not mean that the Court ignores its
previous decisions; it only means that when the Court deems it appropriate, it
will reinterpret previous standards.
21 See generally LEACH, TAKING A CASE, supra note 18, at § 6.351 (“The
state’s primary obligation under Article 8 is negative, that is, not to interfere
with those rights. However, in certain circumstances, the Article imposes
positive obligations, that is, a duty to take appropriate steps to ensure
protection of the rights in question. It is well established that positive
obligations are inherent in the concept of the right to ‘respect’ for private life
under Article 8 … [I]n order to determine whether or not a positive obligation
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a. A General Background on the Movement
of the Court
From its inception, the ECtHR received numerous
individual applications that challenged laws that banned
homosexual conduct, but declared virtually all of those
complaints manifestly ill-founded (i.e., inadmissible).22 This
period shaped the manner in which the Court addressed cases
that sought redress for state interference into the lives of gay
men. Paul Johnson identified W.B. v. Federal Republic of
Germany23 as the first case concerning homosexuality to be
confronted by the ECHR.24 He pointed out that the Commission
held that “the Convention permits a High Contracting Party to
legislate homosexuality as a punishable offense.”25 Notably,
while applicants brought their claim under Articles 2, 8, 14, 17,
and 18 of the Convention,26 the Commission focused its early
decision on the right to private life found in Article 8,27 thus
indicating the proper avenue for future cases to be brought.
Nevertheless, these early cases permitted the ECtHR to
circumvent the issue by relying on the issue of admissibility.28
exists, the Court will assess the fair balance between the general interests of
the community and the interests of the individual.”).
22 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 19–34
(collecting cases).
23 W.B. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 104/55, 1955-57 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. Hum. Rts. 228 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.).
24 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 23.
25 Id., quoting W.B. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 104/55,
1955-57 Y.B. Eur. Conv. Hum. Rts. 228 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.).
26 ECHR, supra note 13, art. 2 (Right to Life), art. 8 (Right to respect for
private and family life); art. 14 (Prohibition of discrimination); art. 17
(Prohibition of abuse of rights); art. 18 (Limitation on use of restrictions on
rights).
27 HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 24 (recognizing that
although the Commission upheld paragraph 175, by classifying the law as one
that interferes with Article 8’s private life clause, it laid the foundation for
future applicants to concentrate their challenges on this provision).; see also
W.B. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No 104/55, 1955-57 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
Hum. Rts. 228 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.) (finding that West Germany’s paragraph
175, which made sexual conduct between two men illegal, did not violate the
Convention); see also JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18,
at 97.
28 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 37.
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In 1977, the Commission first declared an application
that challenged anti-LGB laws admissible in X v. United
Kingdom.29 Although this provided progress, the Commission’s
decision was obscure, which some have argued was likely due to
the ECtHR’s transition from formative to judicial.30 Put another
way, the ECtHR’s concern with legitimacy ultimately indicated
its willingness to set aside important progress on the rights of
an unpopular minority as to not undermine its legitimacy with
Contracting States; in that spirit, the ECtHR obfuscated this
concern through the use of its consensus analysis doctrine.
Nevertheless, the early seminal case for LGB individuals
came in 1981, when the Grand Chamber decided Dudgeon v. the
United Kingdom.31 There, the Grand Chamber held that
Northern Ireland’s anti-sodomy law violated the right to privacy
of homosexual men enumerated in Article 8 of the ECHR.32
Importantly, Dudgeon provides two key takeaways for LGB
activists: (1) an expansive reading of “private life” unblocks an
avenue for LGBT individuals to seek redress from the ECtHR;33
and (2) the Court views homosexuality as “a private
manifestation of the human personality.”34
In 1986, the Court decided Rees v. United Kingdom,
where it held that the right to marry provision enumerated in
Article 12 requires a biological consideration, and therefore
could not be extended to instances where a spouse has
29 X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7215/75, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. Commission (1977).
30 JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 37
(reasoning that, although the ECtHR was obscure in its decision, it most likely
acted due to its transition from a ‘formative’ court to a ‘judicial’ judicial).
31 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. 149 (1981).
32 Id. ¶ 63.
33 Id.
34 Id. ¶ 60. Gary Johnson argues the Court’s established its ontological
definition of homosexuality, and this approach continues to serve as the
foundation of how the Court still views homosexuals. See JOHNSON,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 50, (“Central to the Court’s
recognition that the criminalization of private, homosexual acts constitutes a
violation of Article 8 was the idea that the applicant’s ‘personal circumstances’
and his ‘tendencies’ predisposed him towards particular sexual acts. In this
sense, acknowledging the congenital nature of the applicant’s sexual
orientation was foundation to accepting his status as a victim of criminal
law.”).
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transitioned from one gender to the other, resulting in a malefemale relationship.35 The Court upheld this interpretation but
provided insight into what it may look for in subsequent cases
that would permit it to revisit the issue, as demonstrated in
Cossey v. the United Kingdom in 1990.36 Applying its consensusanalysis doctrine, it held that a consensus had yet to emerge
among contracting States that altered the biological aspect of
Article 12 and would allow the ECtHR to impose a new
standard.37
Twelve years after Cossey, the Grand Chamber reversed
and held that European and international trends moved
sufficiently in the direction of recognizing legal status for
transgender individuals to receive legal recognition of their
proper gender, and thus required the removal of the biological
aspect of gender within the meaning of Article 12.38 Like
Dudgeon, Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom provided
further insight into the factors necessary for subsequent
progress. The Grand Chamber found that although Article 12 is
the only article that identifies “men” and “women” by gender, it
could not “still be assumed that these terms must refer to the
determination of gender by purely biological criteria.”39 Looking
at societal transitions, it held that “there have been major social
changes in the institution of marriage … as well as dramatic
changes brought about by the developments in medicine and
science in the field of transsexuality.”40 To aid its decision, the
Grand Chamber reasoned that the Council of Europe does not
exist in a vacuum, permitting the Grand Chamber to look to
35 Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, ¶ 49 (1986) (“In the
Court’s opinion, the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the
traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological sex.”); ECHR,
supra note 2, art. 12 (“Right to marry – Men and women of marriageable age
have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws
governing the exercise of this right.”). The use of the word “transsexual”
reflects the terminology used in the decision.
36 Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5, ¶ 46 (1990) (“[T]he
developments which have occurred ... cannot be said to evidence any general
abandonment of the traditional concept of marriage.”).
37 Id.
38 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
39 Id. ¶ 100.
40 Id.
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broader international movement on the topic.41 This expansive
consensus analysis provided the push required to apply the
living instrument doctrine and, relying on the social, cultural,
and legal context of that time, reinterpret Article 12 in the light
of the then-contemporary understanding of gender.42
The Court has also progressed on the issue of family life.
Article 8 of the Convention enumerates two important rights:
the right to privacy and the right to family life.43 The Court
steadfastly refrained from an expansive interpretation of family
life, which left only Article 8’s private life as the avenue for
applicants to challenge anti-LGB laws. The ECtHR first
addressed family life as it relates directly to same-sex couples in
1983, when it deemed an application inadmissible because of the
biological aspect of Article 12, and that no consensus had
emerged among contracting States to alter this definition.44 For
example, in Mata Estevez v. Spain, the applicant shared a home,
expenses, and his private life with his partner for a number of

Id. ¶ 84.
See JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 18, at 84–
85 (evaluating the living document approach the Court has taken regarding
the ECHR when it first identified the “dynamic and evolutive” approach in
Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978)).
43 ECHR, supra note 2, 13, § I, art. 8
44 See X and Y v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9369/8, 32 Eur. Comm’n.
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 220 (1983) (holding that although the child ‘Z’ was a British
national, no tangible ill-effect is had on the child if X is not listed as its father
on the birth certificate); id. ¶ 44 (“The Court observes that there is no common
European standard with regard to granting parental rights to transsexuals. In
addition, it has not been established before the Court that there exists any
generally shared approach among the High Contracting Parties with regard to
the manner in which the social relationship between a child conceived by the
AID and the person who performs the role of father should be reflected in law.
Indeed, according to the information available to the Court, although the
technology of medically assisted procreation has been available in Europe for
several decades, many of the issues to which it gives rise ... remain the subject
of debate. For example, there is no consensus amongst the member States ...
on the question whether the interests of a child conceived in such a way are
best served by preserving the anonymity of the donor of the sperm or whether
the child should have the right to know the donor’s identity. Such the issues in
the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is little common ground
amongst member States ... and ... the law appears to be in a transitional stage,
the respondent State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation...”).
41
42
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years.45 However, the Court refused to qualify their relationship
as one of the drafters of the ECHR contemplated when they
included family life in Article 8.46 But it noted that Article 8 in
conjunction with Article 14 may rise to the level of
discrimination, indicating the Court’s willingness to expand
family life to include same-sex couples.47 Nevertheless, the Court
punted and held that marriage constitutes an essential
precondition for eligibility for a survivor’s pension; hence, the
discrimination suffered had reasonable justification.48
Two years after Mata Estevez, the ECtHR reversed its
holding and expanded family life to include same-sex couples. In
Karner v. Austria, the application challenged an Austrian law
that afforded the right of an unmarried partner to inherit the
tenancy of an apartment but failed to encompass homosexuals;
the First Section found this violated Article 8 in conjunction with
Article 14 because Austria did not show the necessity of
discriminating against same-sex partnerships.49 The Fourth
Section applied similar reasoning in Kozak v. Poland, when it
held that Poland’s exclusion of same-sex couples from a law that
provided tenancy succession for de facto marital cohabitation
was discriminatory.50
The issue of same-sex marriage presented itself once
more to the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria.51 There, the
First Section identified the lack of developed consensus among

Mata Estevez v. Spain, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 320–21.
Id. at 321 (holding private life as understood by Article 8 does not
guarantee access for the surviving partner of a same-sex couple to a deceased
partner’s pension regardless of the emotional and sexual relationship).
47 Id. at 321; ECHR, supra, note 2, art. 14 (“Prohibition of discrimination
– the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”).
48 See Mata Estevez, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 314.
49 Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 199, ¶ 37 (“The Court
reiterates that ... a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no
objective and reasonable justification.”).
50 Kozak v. Poland, App. No. 13102/02, 2010 Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶¶ 92–99.
51 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.
45
46
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European States to expand marriage to same-sex couples.52
Further, it noted the difference in terms: Article 12 genders the
right with its use of “men and women,” but the use of “everyone”
found in Article 8 meant that gender was not a consideration for
the rights enumerated in that article.53 Schalk unshackled
“family life” under Article 8 by removing the gendered
constraints previously affixed, even though it inflexibly adhered
to those same constraints in regards to the right to marriage
under Article 12. Nevertheless, this expansive reading of Article
8 brought the issue to light with Kozak.
Thus, the ECtHR evolved substantially from Dudgeon in
1981 to Schalk in 2010. Nevertheless, even as the ECtHR
continued to slowly move on the issue, same-sex couples began
to see their rights vindicated as more countries began to provide
legal partnership recognition either through alternative
schemes such as civil unions or by ending state sponsored
discrimination by expanding marriage.
a. Schalk and Vallianatos – What
Did the ECtHR Say?
Schalk laid the foundation upon which the ECtHR built
Vallianatos and Oliari. Vallianatos applied that criteria set
forth in Schalk and produced a favorable decision for same-sex
couples, and Oliari builds upon Vallianatos with its expansive
application of “State movement.”
As previously noted, Schalk’s significance stems from the
ECtHR’s acknowledgment that Article 8’s family life also applies
to same-sex partnerships.54 Prior to this decision, the ECtHR
expressly refused to include same-sex partnerships and their
families within the scope of this provision, only extending the

52 Id. ¶ 58 (“[T]he institution of marriage has undergone major social
change since the adoption of the Convention, the Court notes that there is no
European consensus regarding same-sex marriage.”).
53 Id. ¶ 60 (Comparing Article 12 with Article 8 does not mean that samesex couples should be denied “family life” due to biological sex, but the
difference in wording between “men and women” and “everyone” is notable to
withhold an expansive reading of Article 12 to include same-sex couples).
54 Id.
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right to private life found in Article 8 to same-sex couples.55 By
expanding family life, the ECtHR fundamentally shifted the
conversation.
At the time that the First Section decided Schalk, only
six of the forty-seven Contracting States of the Council of Europe
recognized same-sex marriages and only thirteen extended some
form of partnership reorganization (e.g., civil unions).56 The
applicants, two cohabitating Austrian nationals in a same-sex
relationship, claimed that Austria discriminated against them
when they were denied the right to marry or to have a
relationship otherwise recognized by law.57 The applicants
brought their claims under Article 12 and Article 14 taken in
conjunction with Article 8.58 On the issue of admissibility,
Austria failed to provide a strong argument against the
complaint as it related to Article 12 of the Convention, which the
First Section determined was satisfied due to the complex
nature and the issue of law and fact it raised.59 For the alleged
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the
First Section affirmed admissibility but determined that the
applicants failed to achieve victim status.60 The reasoning
See Mata Estevez, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 321.
Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 27–28.
57 Id. ¶¶ 1–3.
58 Id. ¶¶ 40, 65.
59 Id. ¶¶ 40–41 (“The Court observes that the Government raised the
question whether the applicants’ complaint fell within the scope of Article 12,
given that they were two men claiming the right to marry. The Government
did not argue, however that the complaint was inadmissible as being
incompatible ratione materiae. The Court agrees that the issue is sufficiently
complex not to be susceptible of being resolved at the admissibility stage. The
Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint
raises serious issues of fact and of law under the Convention, the
determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court
concludes, therefore, that this this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded…
No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible has been established.”).
60 Id. ¶¶ 73–74 (“The Court reiterates that an applicant’s status as a
victim may depend on compensation being awarded at the domestic level on
the basis of the facts about which he or she complains before the Court and on
whether the domestic authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in
substance, the breach of the Convention. … [T]he Court does not have to
examine whether the first condition has been fulfilled, as the second condition
has not been met. The government had made it clear that the Registered
Partnership Act was introduced a matter of policy choice and not in order to
55
56
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applied by the First Section portends its ultimate holding:
Austria did not violate the Convention by failing to extend
partnership recognition to same-sex couples.61
The First Section began its assessment on the alleged
Article 12 complaint by acknowledging its previous movement
away from the concept of traditional marriage. It cited Goodwin
as an example of its willingness to interpret Article 12 in light of
the circumstances that existed at the time of the case.62 Recall
that in Goodwin, the Grand Chamber acknowledged a
crystalized consensus among the Contracting States that an
individual who undergoes sexual-reassignment surgery can
marry a member of the opposite sex.63 In doing so, the Grand
Chamber removed the biological aspect of sex from the concept
of marriage as contemplated by Article 12; this did not mean
that biological sex was irrelevant, but only that an individual
who undergoes sex reassignment surgery can participate in
marriage with a member of the now opposite sex.64 It further
acknowledged, however, that this did not extend marriage to
couples in pre-existing marriages when one partner seeks to
transition to the other sex, which afforded the State the ability
to force that couple to divorce prior to acknowledging a change
in sex.65
The petitioners in Schalk argued that, although Article
12 contains the words “men and women,” one could read that as

fulfil an obligation under the Convention.”). This note avoided a discussion on
victim status as understood by the ECtHR as it did not afford any substantive
value to this analysis. It was included in the analysis of Schalk only because
of its relation to the final decision.
61 Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 110.
62 Id. ¶ 51.
63 Id.
64 Id. ¶ 52 (“[The Court] considered that the terms used by Article 12
which referred to the right of a man and woman no longer had to be understood
as determining gender by purely biological criteria.”). This concept is not
unique to Europe; prior to Obergefell, some U.S. states recognized that
transgender individuals could marry a member of the opposite gender if they
had met necessary legal requirements.
65 Id. ¶ 53 (“The Court concluded that it fell within the State’s margin of
appreciation as to how to regulate the effects of the change of gender on preexisting marriages.”) (citing Parry v. the United Kingdom, 2006-XV Eur. Ct.
H.R. 271; R. and F. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35748/05, 28 November 2006).
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meaning “two men” or “two women.”66 The First Section
dismissed this argument by stating that the specific language of
Article 12, as compared to other Articles, indicates that the
framers intended to restrict marriage to members of the opposite
sex.67 In refusing to accept the applicants’ argument, the First
Section ultimately held that even though the applicants did not
utilize an entirely textualist argument, even relying on the
ECtHR’s living instrument doctrine, the light of present day
circumstances had yet to mean that Article 12 obligates
Contracting States to extend marriage to same-sex couples.68
The First Section next addressed the alleged violation of
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.
To start the analysis, it acknowledged that established case law
recognized that family life under Article 8 does not require a
marriage.69 The ECtHR affords States a wide margin of
appreciation to define family life because of the lack of common
ground between the Contracting States. Due to the rapidly
changing landscape within the Council of Europe, it held that,
in light of present-day circumstances, a consensus had emerged
that family life encompasses same-sex couples in de facto
partnerships.70
The applicants argued that one may derive a right to
marriage from taking Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8,
which they supported by reasoning that one must read the
Convention as a whole and the Articles construed in harmony
with one another.71 Further, the applicants predicated this
argument on the notion that the failure to extend marriage
rights to same-sex couples treated same-sex couples different
than opposite-sex couples, thus violating Article 12 in
conjunction with Article 8.72 This argument, however, failed to
consider the wide margin of appreciation afforded to Contracting
Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 54–55.
Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 60 (holding that because other articles use “everyone”
while Article 12 uses “men and women,” the wording implies a deliberate
intent).
68 Id. ¶ 58.
69 Id. ¶ 91.
70 Id. ¶¶ 91, 94.
71 Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 101.
72 Id. ¶ 96.
66
67
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States in this circumstance.73 The First Section viewed this
argument as inherently flawed, stating that if its previous
holding that Article 12 does not guarantee the right to marry to
same-sex couples, then Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8,
a broader provision, cannot be interpreted to create an obligation
either.74
Further, the First Section determined that a lack of
consensus still had yet to emerge, as a majority of Contracting
States had yet to move on the issue of same-sex partnership
recognition, but it did identify an emerging consensus.75
Therefore, the First Section found no obligation for Austria to
provide same-sex couples with access to marriage.76 Finally, the
First Section concluded that the Contracting States remain free
to restrict access to marriage and to determine the extent to
which an alternative scheme confers rights similar to marriage
to same-sex couples.77
Schalk may not have extended the right to marriage to
same-sex couples or created a positive obligation on Contracting
States to provide an alternative scheme for partnership
recognition, but it did offer three redeeming aspects: (1) Article
12 is no longer exclusive to opposite-sex couples in all
circumstances; (2) it extended the right to family life to samesex couples; and (3) it acknowledged an emerging consensus
among the Contracting States in regards to legal partnership
recognition for same-sex couples.78
73 Id. ¶¶ 96–98 (Acknowledging a narrow margin of appreciation for
state regulation on sex and sexual orientation but a broad margin of
appreciation general measurers of economic and social strategy).
74 Id.
75 Id. ¶ 105 (“Nevertheless, there is not yet a majority of States providing
for legal recognition of same-sex couples. This area in question must therefore
still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus, where
States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the
introduction of legislative changes.”) (citations omitted).
76 Id. ¶ 106 (“The Austrian Registered Partnership Act, which came into
force on 1 January 2010, reflects the evolution described above and is thus part
of the emerging European consensus. Though not in the vanguard, the
Austrian legislator cannot be reproached for not having introduced the
Registered Partnership Act earlier.”).
77 Id. ¶¶ 108–09.
78 Loveday Hodson, A Marriage by Any Other Name?, 11 HUM. RIGHTS L.
REV. 170, 176 (2011) (“[T]he Court acknowledged an emerging European
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Three years after the decision in Schalk, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued its
decision in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece.79 Where Schalk
first extended family life to same-sex couples and began to
further erode the biological aspect previously incorporated into
marriage, Vallianatos identified circumstances where a positive
obligation to provide legal recognition to same-sex couples will
manifest.
On November 26, 2008, the “Reforms concerning the
family, children and society,” which created an alternative
scheme to marriage restricted only to opposite-sex couples, went
into effect in Greece.80 An explanatory report justified this law
by recognizing the social reality of modern Greece–many couples
wished to have more flexibility in regards to their staterecognized unions.81 Although some pushed for the inclusion of
same-sex couples, the legislature felt that Greek society was “not
yet ready to accept cohabitation between same-sex couples.”82
The Grand Chamber granted admissibility for two
reasons: (1) although two of the applicants did not meet the
criteria, the remaining applicants satisfied the criteria for victim
status as described in Article 34; and (2) the Government failed
to show how the applicants could receive sufficient remedy in
domestic courts or that the applicants failed to exhaust domestic
remedies.83
On the merits of the case, the Greek government argued,
inter alia, that the point of the law was to protect children born
to different sex couples who were already living in de facto
partnerships, but that the civil unions were to provide an
alternative partnership scheme to heterosexual couples who
wish to have more flexibility relative to marriage.84 The
government further relied on the claim that the law was justified
under the existing social phenomenon of opposite-sex couples
consensus towards recognition and indicated that its case law would be
responsive to it.”).
79 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 125.
80 Id. ¶ 9.
81 Id. ¶ 10.
82 Id. ¶¶ 13–14.
83 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 47–59.
84 Id. ¶ 61.
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raising children out of wedlock and their interest in protecting
the legal rights of their families.85 That is, the legislature did not
intend to regulate all non-married, opposite-sex couples who
were already offered some de facto rights for their unrecognized
partnerships, but wanted to offer more protection for those nonmarried, opposite-sex couples with children.86 The applicants
countered that the law was out-of-step with other European
countries that had introduced civil unions, and that the clear
intent of the law was to regulate non-married couples who did
not wish to marry, whether they had, or intended to have,
children.87
Previously, the ECtHR refused to include Article 14 of
the Convention, which contemplates issues related to different
treatment of individuals, in an analysis concerning same-sex
families. However, Schalk’s expansive view of family life enabled
the Grand Chamber to apply Article 14 to same-sex couples and
narrow the margin of appreciation previously enjoyed by the
Contracting States when it takes Article 8 in conjunction with
Article 14.88 One should recall that this is not out-of-step with
Schalk, as the First Section in Schalk acknowledged the interest
a same-sex couple has in civil unions, but afforded the State a
greater margin of appreciation on regulating marriage as
permitted under Article 12 of the Convention. On this point, the
Grand Chamber found that the raison d’être of Greece’s action
was to create an alternative scheme for the purpose of governing
the contract between two opposite-sex couples for the purpose of
living as a couple.89 The government did not confine the law only
to child-rearing, but included regulation on financial relations,
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶ 64.
87 Id. ¶¶ 60–61.
88 Id. ¶¶ 76–77 (“The notion of discrimination within the meaning of
Article 14 also includes cases where a person or group is treated, without
proper justification, less favourably than another, even though the more
favorable treatment is not called for by the Convention . . . Sexual orientation
is a concept covered by Article 14. The Court has repeatedly held that, just like
differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation require
‘particularly convincing and weighty reasons’ by way of justification . . .
Differences based on sexual orientation are unacceptable under the
Convention.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
89 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61.
85
86
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maintenance obligations, the right to inherit, and dissolution of
the union.90 For those reasons, the Grand Chamber did not
accept the government’s argument that it undertook this action
due to the interest in children born or raised by an unwed
couple.91
Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber held that in this
context, when the Contracting State has a narrow margin of
appreciation, the principle of proportionality requires that the
State only act out of necessity to exclude individuals (or groups)
from achieving its aim, firmly placing the burden of proof on the
government to show why exclusion is necessary.92 Applying the
principle of proportionality to the issue at hand, the Grand
Chamber once again acknowledged an emerging consensus
among States for legal recognition of same-sex relationships.93
However, the consensus that the Grand Chamber did identify
was based on the fact that of all the Contracting States that
introduced legal and alternative partnership schemes for unwed
couples, they all included same-sex couples, with Greece and
Lithuania serving as the exceptions.94 Hence, the consensus is
not that one must provide same-sex couples with legal
partnership recognition, but if a Contracting State chose to
introduce a scheme for unwed couples, it must include same-sex
couples.
The Grand Chamber further noted that Resolution 1728
(2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
which called on Contracting States to ensure legal recognition of
same-sex couples and specifically identifying alternative
schemes for unmarried couples, supported the notion that States
should include same-sex couples within any alternative

Id.
Id. ¶ 89 (“[T]he Court notes firstly that the Government’s arguments
focus on the situation of different-sex couples with children, without justifying
the difference in treatment arising out of the legislation in question between
same-sex and different-sex couples who are not parents. Secondly, the Court is
not convinced by the Government’s argument that the attainment through
[the] law . . . of the goals to which they refer presupposes excluding same-sex
couples from its scope.”).
92 Id. ¶ 85.
93 Id. ¶ 91.
94 Id.
90
91

21

VITO J MARZANO - OLIARI (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

OLIARI AND THE ECtHR

10/27/2017 2:27 PM

271

partnership schemes.95 Put another way, the Grand Chamber
identified an emerged consensus that if a State acts to create an
alternative scheme that extends to unwed couples the rights
otherwise reserved for married couples, the Convention places a
positive obligation on the State to include same-sex couples in
that scheme. For a State to not include same-sex couples, they
must have convincing and weighty reasons to justify that
exclusion.96 Therefore, Greece violated Article 8 taken in
conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention by excluding samesex couples from its civil union law.97
Vallianatos builds on the foundation of Schalk in a
significant way- Schalk extended family life to include same-sex
couples but stopped short of placing a positive obligation on
Austria to act earlier than it did to extend some legal recognition
to those couples; Vallianatos, for the first time, identified a
positive obligation for a State to extend legal recognition to
same-sex couples, but it does so only if the State chooses to act
on the issue of legal recognition for unmarried couples. The
Grand Chamber failed to identify a consensus for providing legal
recognition, but held that, if a State chooses to create an
alternative partnership recognition, even if just for opposite-sex
couples, it must do so inclusive of same-sex couples.98 The
question now posed focuses on whether Oliari alters this
understanding.
II.

OLIARI AND OTHERS V. ITALY

The Fourth Section of the European Court of Human
Rights in Oliari and Others v. Italy held that Italy’s failure to
extend any legal recognition to same-sex couples violated Article
8 of the Convention.99 The holding signals a natural progression
95 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 61, 28–30; see also id. ¶ 91
(“[T]his trend is reflected in the relevant Council of Europe materials . . . [T]he
Court refers particularly to Resolution 1728(2010) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and to Committee of Ministers
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5.”) (citations omitted).
96 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 92.
97 Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
98 This note withheld an analysis of the concurring and dissenting
opinions as they addressed other issues presented.
99 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R.¶ 205.
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of ECtHR jurisprudence respective to the rights for homosexuals
under the ECHR. Nevertheless, Oliari fails to address many of
the issues facing same-sex families and is narrowly-tailored in
such a way that it remains seemingly only applicable to the
circumstances found in Italy.
a. The Relevant Articles of the European
Convention on Human Rights and
Admissibility
The applicants in Oliari claimed that the failure on the
part of the Italian Government (“Italy;” “the Government”) to
legally recognize same-sex couples violated Article 8 alone,
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, and Article 12 alone, and
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 12.100
As a threshold matter, the Fourth Section recognized the
undisputed fact that Article 8’s “private life” contemplates LGB
individuals; reiterated that Article 8’s “family life” encompasses
same-sex couples in de facto partnerships; and concluded that
the facts of the case-at-bar meet the admissibility requirements
of Article 8.101 Further, as Article 14 serves as a complementary
provision to the other substantive provisions, and as Italy did
not contest applicability, because Article 8 applies on its own,
Article 14 with Article 8 also meets the admissibility
requirements.102
In regards to Article 12, the Applicants argued that
because more countries have legislated in favor of same-sex
marriage post-Schalk, and because the ECtHR interprets the
Convention as a living document, the facts of this case warrant
a reevaluation of the subject matter in light of the present day.103
While the Fourth Section did determine that Article 12 no longer
applies exclusively to heterosexual couples, Schalk failed to
expand Article 12 to include same-sex couples, stating that
Id. ¶¶ 99, 188–190.
Id. ¶ 106. Recall that the Court first expanded private life to apply to
homosexuals in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom and recognized family life to
include de facto same-sex couples in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria.
102 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 102–04.
103 Id. ¶ 189.
100
101
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although it recognizes an emerging European consensus
towards legal recognition of same-sex couples, it cannot find a
crystalized consensus among the Contracting States that would
place a positive obligation to extend marriage to same-sex
couples, and that States maintain a broad margin of
appreciation when it comes to regulating marriage; thus, the
exclusion of same-sex couples does not offend the Convention.104
As a consensus had yet to emerge, the Article 12 claim was
manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, was inadmissible.105
b. The Italian Constitution and Same-Sex
Partnership Recognition
Prior to taking the case to the ECtHR, the applicants
sought redress within the domestic court system. The
Constitutional Court of Italy on April 15, 2010 held that denying
same-sex couples access to legal recognition and benefits similar
to marriage violates Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, and
identified a legal lacuna due to the failure to formally recognize
any form of same-sex partnerships.106 Nevertheless, the Italian
Court was powerless to rectify the issue as, by nature of the
Italian system, it cannot act on its own and it cannot force the
legislature to act.107
The Fourth Section noted that the Italian parliament had
debated the subject matter since 1986.108 In fact, the
Government referenced this debate as a predicate to its
argument that Italy acted within its margin of appreciation by

Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, ¶¶ 105, 108
(finding a lack of consensus among contracting stats that would place a positive
obligation under either Article 12 or Article 8 to extend marriage rights to
same-sex couples, or to require some form of partnership benefits).
105 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 192 (at the time of Oliari, only eleven
states had same-sex marriage); id. ¶ 194. (“It follows that both the complaint[s]
… are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article
35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.”).
106 Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
107 Id. Similarly, the ECtHR cannot force a State to act; it can merely
find when the State’s action (or inaction) offends a Convention provision and
issue a fine against that State.
108 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 126.
104
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continuing to debate the subject matter.109 Nevertheless, the
Government argued that because a consensus had yet to emerge,
the ECtHR cannot find that it violated Article 8 for failing to
move on the issue.110 The Fourth Section rejected this argument,
stating that while domestic governments are usually better
placed to assess the interest of the community, the fact that the
Constitutional Court of Italy identified an unconstitutional legal
lacuna that the legislature must remedy and that this issue had
been considered by the Italian parliament previously, the
continued failure of the legislature to move on the subject
sufficiently demonstrates that Italy violated its margin of
appreciation within Article 8.111 The Fourth Section further
observed that providing civil unions was “an expression [that]
reflects the sentiments of a majority of the Italian population, as
shown through official surveys.”112
The Fourth Section further utilized Italy’s long delayed
action to indicate that it had a positive obligation to act,113 which
implicates Vallianatos as an indirect analogy. That is to say, in
Vallianatos, the Greek Government passed an alternative
scheme to marriage, and the Grand Chamber held that because
of the strong interest of same-sex couples in legal protections,
any alternative partnership scheme cannot exclude same-sex
couples,114 but in Oliari, the fact that Italy had debated this
issue for decades, and the fact that the Constitutional Court has
identified that the legal lacuna is unconstitutional, a positive
obligation can be identified that required Italy to provide
partnership recognition to same-sex couples.115 In that regard,
Id.
Id.
111 Id. ¶¶ 179–80.
112 Id. ¶ 181 (“The statistics submitted indicate that there is amongst
the Italian population a popular acceptance of homosexual couples, as well as
public support for their recognition and protection.”).
113 See id. ¶ 166.
114 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 47–59.
115 The ECtHR also identified a decision from the Italian Court of
Cessasion from 2012, where the Court of Cessasion concluded that foreign
marriages could not be recognized because that recognition would have no legal
ramification in Italy, but persons living in a stable relationship were entitled
to private and family life protections under Article 8 of the Convention; thus,
the failure on the part of Italy to offer some type of analogous partnership
109
110
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the analysis suggests that the Fourth Section did not suddenly
recognize a new positive obligation, but that it merely expands
the positive obligation previously identified that manifests when
the State begins to act. Ultimately, the Fourth Section
considered: (1) the Italian parliament had debated this issue
since 1986;116 (2) in 2010 the Constitutional Court identified a
legal lacuna in denying same-sex couples the right to marry;117
(3) in 2012 the Court of Cessation found that Italy’s failure to
offer any legal recognition analogous to marriage likely violates
the ECHR;118 and (4) the Italian public favored granting samesex couples the right to legal recognition.119 The Fourth Section
used these factors to find that the Parliament was not acting as
the best arbiter for the desires of the Italian people, and that in
this instance, the court rulings coupled with opinion polls clearly
indicated a preference for granting same-sex couples legal
recognition, thus narrowing Italy’s margin of appreciation.120
a. The Emerging Trend among Contracting
States
The ECtHR has taken small steps towards recognizing a
positive obligation under Article 8 requiring legal recognition of
same-sex couples. As previously discussed, Schalk expanded the
purview of Article 12 regarding gender, but fell short of finding
a positive obligation for the recognition of same-sex marriage.121
By the time Schalk reached the First Section, Austria passed the
Registered Partnership Act, creating a legal scheme for samesex couples to receive similar rights to heterosexual couples.
This meant that the First Section declined to address whether
scheme contravened the Convention. Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35. See also
Sabrina Ragone & Valentina Volpe, An Emerging Right to “Gay” Family Life?
The case of Oliari v. Italy in a Comparative Perspective, 17 German L.J. 451,
455–56 (2016) (providing an analysis of the decisions from the Italian
Constitutional Court and Court of Cessation and their impact on the decision
of the European Court of Human Rights).
116 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 126.
117 Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
118 Id. ¶ 35.
119 Id. ¶ 190.
120 See id. ¶ 59.
121 See Schalk, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.
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Article 8 places a positive obligation on Contracting States to
extend legal recognition to same-sex couples. The First Section,
however, held that Austria’s movement on the issue lent itself to
an emerging consensus for partnership recognition. Hence,
Austria acted within its margin of appreciation, even if a little
late to the game.122
In Vallianatos v. Greece, the Grand Chamber recognized
a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide legal recognition
to same-sex couples; it did so under the premise that if the
Contracting State acts to create an alternative partnership
scheme relative to marriage, it cannot do so while excluding
same-sex couples.123 Greece violated Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 8 because the process of recognizing de facto
cohabitation, and affording those unregistered partnerships
rights usually reserved for marriage, must not discriminate due
to sexual orientation.124 Put another way, under Schalk, a
Contracting State does not have a positive obligation to extend
marriage to same-sex couples, but under Vallianatos, if they
choose to create an alternative scheme of partnership
recognition for non-married couples, they cannot exclude samesex couples from the scheme. The logic behind the ECtHR’s
holding focuses primarily on which emerging consensus applies.
That is to say, many other Contracting States previously
introduced some form of alternative to marriage, but in all cases
except for Greece and Lithuania, those alternatives included
same-sex partners. Thus, the act of establishing an alternative
scheme to marriage became the consensus the ECtHR identified,
and that action created a positive obligation to include same-sex
couples.125
122 Id. ¶ 105; see also id. ¶ 106 (“Though not in the vanguard, the
Austrian legislation cannot be reproached for not having introduced the
Registered Partnership Act any earlier.”).
123 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
124 See Id. ¶ 89.
125 Id. ¶ 91 (“[T]he Court would point to the fact that, although there is
no consensus among the legal systems of ... member States, a trend is currently
emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of samesex relationships. Nine member States provide same-sex marriage. In addition,
seventeen member States authorise some form of civil partnership for samesex couples. As to the specific issue raised by the present case, the Court
considers that the trend emerging in the legal systems of the ... member States
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One must consider the distinction between Vallianatos
and Oliari. Following the logic in Vallianatos, a positive
obligation manifests when the Contracting State chooses to act.
In a sense, this creates a negative obligation to simply not act if
a Contracting State wishes to remain within the margin of
appreciation for not extending any legal recognition to same-sex
couples. In Oliari, however, the applicants claim that by not
establishing civil unions (or marriage), the Contracting State
violated the Convention. Considering the short time between
Vallianatos and Oliari, the number of States recognizing some
form of partnership recognition remained relatively stable.126
Oliari did not move the issue substantially, but expanded the
type of state action that constitutes movement: in Vallianatos,
the action of the Greek government and the resulting alternative
partnership scheme created the positive obligation; in Oliari, the
action by the Italian government, in debating partnership
recognition for three decades, the unconstitutional lacuna
identified by the Italian Constitutional Court, and the
Parliament’s failure to act, created the positive obligation.
Hence, Oliari broadens the consensus by including movement by
the government, not that it necessarily requires an actual
alternative scheme to have been implemented. Further, it
indicates what “movement” may mean.
The Fourth Section emphasized developments outside of
the Council of Europe. For instance, the decision acknowledged
that the Supreme Court of the United States recognized a
constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples in
is clear: of the nineteen States which authorize some form of registered
partnership other than marriage, Lithuania and Greece are the only ones to
reserve it exclusively to different-sex couples. In other words, with two
exceptions ... when they opt to enact legislation introducing a new system of
registered partnership as an alternative to marriage for unmarried couples,
include same-sex couples in its scope.”). But see Clair Poppelwell-Scevak, The
Euroepan Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage. The Consensus
Approach 41–45 (Ohio Law School, PluriCourts Research Paper No. 16–10,
2016) (arguing there continues to be confusion among scholars on what an
emerging consensus is, and using trend in place of emerging consensus more
aptly describes the process of the Court as it relates to LGBTQI rights),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2832756.
126 See Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 9; see also Oliari, 2015 Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 205.
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Obergefell v. Hodges.127 But the Fourth Section implied that the
Supreme Court reached this decision by undertaking a
consensus analysis because it only found that same-sex
marriage was a right after most States permitted it.128 Under
this logic, had a majority of states not expanded marriage rights
to same-sex couples, the Supreme Court may have found
differently.129 This implication seeks to legitimatize the ECtHR’s
reluctance on the issue.
a. The Concurring Opinion
Three judges concurred that Italy did violate Article 8 of
the Convention, but did not find that the Convention imposed a
positive obligation on States to act.130 They reasoned that by
acting voluntarily, Italy chose to intervene in the personal
relations of homosexuals, as understood by Article 8, and that
action triggered a positive obligation.131 The violation finds its
root in the defective nature of the Italian system, in that the
Constitutional Court has the power to interpret the Italian
Constitution but does not have the power to enforce its
holding.132
The Concurrence noted that the Majority’s opinion
applied a narrow application of the doctrines in circumstances
Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 65, citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct.
2584 (2015) (recognizing a fundamental right under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment for same-sex couples to marry).
128 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 65 (“[N]oting that many States already allowed
same-sex marriage ... [the Supreme Court] opined that the disruption caused
by the recognition bans was significant and ever-growing.”).
129 In that sense, had the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the issue
earlier, it would have not reached the conclusion that it did, or U.S. states
would maintain a broader margin of appreciation in regards to their respective
marriage laws. This supports the notion that the ECtHR’s concern for
legitimacy impacts its willingness to move on an issue; the consensus analysis
doctrine inhibits the ability of the ECtHR to evolve. However, one should not
disregard the tremendous steps made by the ECtHR to protect minority rights.
When the ECtHR decided Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, it did so in the
vanguard. Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy would cite Dudegon in 2003 in
Lawrence v. Texas, which overturned anti-sodomy laws in the United States.
130 Oliari 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 1 (Mahoney, concurring).
131 Id.
132 Id.
127
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unique to Italy.133 It reasoned that the Majority is “careful to
limit their finding … to Italy and to ground their conclusion on
a combination of factors not necessarily found in other
Contracting States … [W]e are not sure that such a limitation of
a positive obligation under the Convention to local conditions is
conceptually possible.”134 Thus, the positive obligation only
applies to Italy. However, whether it is feasible to so narrowly
limit the positive obligation to one State remains
undetermined.135 Furthermore, the Concurrence spoke to the
misapplication in the Majority’s use of positive obligation.136
That is, the Majority suggested a positive obligation on all
Contracting States, but that should not apply to all Contracting
States; rather, the defect here cannot be found in the terms of a
failure to fulfill a positive obligation, but in defective State
intervention in the sphere of private and family life.137
c. What does Oliari Accomplish?
Oliari may not accomplish anything in the immediate
future. The decision does identify some key issues that
proponents of same-sex marriage, or civil unions, must address
prior to any further movement within the scope of the Council of
Europe. But the holding remains firmly narrow and still in line
with Vallianatos and Schalk.

Id. ¶ 9 (Mahoney, concurring).
Id. ¶ 10 (“Our colleagues are careful to limit their finding ... to Italy
and to ground their conclusion on a combination of factors not necessarily
found in other Contracting States. [W]e are not sure that such a limitation of
a positive obligation under the Convention to local conditions is conceptually
possible.”) (concurring opinion).
135 Id. (concurring opinion).
136 Id. (concurring opinion).
137 Id. ¶ 10. The note offers that one can interpret the differences as
highly nuanced, and they seem prima facie identical. The Majority finds a
positive obligation when the Government moves on the issue, with Oliari
expanding what qualifies as movement. The Concurrence places the issue on
Italy’s interference with private and family life. In essence, ‘movement’ and
‘interference’ are the same thing. The disagreement, however, is whether it
was appropriate to use this instance to expand what ‘movement’ means. I offer
that I am partial to the argument put forward by the Concurrence, on the
ground that it implies progress on the issue when none really exists.
133
134
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The Fourth Section based its position on the fact that the
Government failed to present an argument that it has a
prevailing community interest in restricting access of
partnership recognition to same-sex couples.138 The Fourth
Section acknowledged that Contracting States maintain a wide
margin of appreciation within the context of private life when a
consensus among Contracting States within the Council of
Europe has yet to crystalize.139 The flexible margin of
appreciation enjoyed by Contracting States depends entirely on
the positive obligation found under Article 8; that is, when
determining if such an obligation exists, the ECtHR will utilize
the fair balancing test, weighing the general interest against the
interest of the individual.140 The Fourth Section identified the
individual interest argued by the applicants, that there is a
particular interest in obtaining civil unions, as this is an
appropriate alternative to marriage and functions as a way to
grant legal protections enjoyed by heterosexual couples.141 The
Fourth Section noted that the Italian Government did not
present an explicit interest of the community as a whole to
justify its failure to extend partnership benefits to same-sex
couples.142
The Court identified that social and ethical sensitivities
create a broad margin of appreciation, but noted that the instant
case lacks such sensitivity.143 The case addresses the need for
individuals to have access to legal protections and the core
protections that applicants desire as same-sex couples.144 Thus,
while social and ethical sensitivities may exist, and may remain
Id. ¶ 181.
Id. ¶ 162. I emphasize the usage of the Council of Europe. This
indicates that the movement must be virtually entirely internal, as unless
some seismic shift occurs externally that places the Council of Europe in a
vacuum, the member States must move the Court.
140 See JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COURT, supra note 7, at 96
(quoting Van Kück v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 70-71); see also Oliari,
2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 162 (“There will also usually be a wide margin if the State
is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests
or Convention rights.”).
141 Oliari, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 174.
142 Id. ¶ 176.
143 Id. ¶ 111.
144 Id. ¶ 177.
138
139
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a concern for the State, those sensitivities do not overcome the
individual interest in seeking legal protections.145
Ultimately, the logical interpretation follows along with
Vallianatos, in that the Italian parliament began to act on the
subject in 1986 and its courts acted as recently as 2010, but legal
recognition for same-sex couples remained in a state of limbo, as
in Greece where the Government acted to extend rights to
heterosexual couples in de facto unions while actively excluding
same-sex couples.146 In both of the instances, the fact that the
State committed an action created the positive obligation. In
Schalk, the First Section did not address the issue of civil unions
because the legislature acted prior to the any action by the
Court, thus rending any action moot.147 In this sense, Oliari only
maintains the status quo and does not expand the rights of
same-sex couples. However, one can distinguish Oliari from
Vallianatos in a clear fashion: where in Vallianatos it was
Greece’s choice to discriminate against same-sex couples in its
alternative partnership scheme, in Oliari, it was the failure of
the parliament to act within the desire of the Italian population
after a legal lacuna had been identified, thereby temporarily
removing the Parliament from its responsibility as an arbiter. In
that sense, Oliari may provide a framework for when the ECtHR
will not pay deference to a choice by the Contracting State’s
legislature to withhold legal benefits from same-sex couples.
e. Reactions to Oliari
Oliari has received mixed reactions.148 One report noted
the shortcomings of the decision, acknowledging that the ECtHR
suggested the predicate factor for such an obligation remains on

Id. ¶ 123.
See generally Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 125.
147 See generally Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409.
148 Giuseppe Zago, A Victory for Italian Same-Sex Couples, A Victory for
European Homosexuals? A Commentary on Oliari v Italy 6, (Leiden Law
School, Article 29, 2015). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2689060 (“[T]he Chamber
did not make explicit whether the obligation to introduce a legal framework for
homosexual couples has to be referred merely to the specific Italian situation,
or if the Court intended to assert a more general principle, as it seems from
the reading of some passages in the judgment.”).
145
146
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the general acceptance of Italian society.149 Paul Johnson viewed
Oliari as a groundbreaking judgment, recognizing that while the
facts are unique to Italy, the establishment of a positive
obligation for legal recognition where no other action had been
taken by the Contracting State is a momentous step forward.150
However, one reaction questioned whether the ECtHR will
recognize that other Contracting States have a positive
obligation to provide same-sex partnership recognition, and if
such an obligation were found, would the more conservative
Contracting States of the Council of Europe adhere to the
Court’s decision?151
Ultimately, the ramifications of Oliari remain
unresolved. The ECtHR has not clearly determined whether
Article 8 creates a positive obligation for recognition of same-sex

149 Peter Laverack, Olari v. Italy: a missed opportunity for equality in
Strasbourg, LSE HUMAN RIGHTS (July 31, 2015), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk
/humanrights/2015/07/31/oliari-v-italy-a-missed-opportunity-for-equality-instrasbourg/ (“More concerning still, the decision to grant civil partnership, as
opposed to nothing at all, was premised on the general acceptance of the samesex relationships within Italian society. Those who wish to keep LGBT people
in the shadows will no doubt seize upon this. The Starsbourg Court is simply
wrong to link rights with acceptance.”).
150 Paul Johnson, Ground-breaking judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in Oliari and Others v Italy: same-sex couples in Italy must have
access to civil unions/registered partnerships, ECHR SEXUAL ORIENTATION
BLOG, (July 21, 2015 4:15 PM), http://echrso.blogspot.com/2015/07/groundbreaking-judgment-of-european.html (“This is a ground-breaking judgment
that advances the human rights and freedoms of same-sex couples in
significant ways. It establishes that there is a positive obligation for Italy
under Article 8 to provide same-sex couples with some form of legal recognition
of their relationships. Although this positive obligation has been established in
the context of the social and legal relations of Italy, it is clear that this may set
an important precedent in respect of all other states.”).
151 Edward Delman, An Ambiguous Victory for Gay Rights in Europe,
ATLANTIC,
July
24,
2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2015/07/gay-rights-italy-europe/399572/ (“The reality is that if the
ECtHR were, in the future, to order Russia to recognize same-sex unions, it
would have no surefire way of enforcing that judgment. The Committee of
Ministers cannot apply sanctions or similar penalties to ensure compliance; it
can only apply continuous diplomatic pressure on a given member ... But
pressure can only go so far, and short of expelling a state from the court, there
is little the ECtHR can do to require a nation to adopt measures that are
anathema to it.”).
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couples. It has signaled to Contracting States its intention and
possible desire to recognize a right to partnership recognition.
III.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
POSSIBLE SIGNALS OF THE COURT

The ECtHR did not break new ground with its decision
in Oliari, Rather, it merely expanded on its previous rulings in
Schalk and Vallianatos. The impact of these cases on Greece and
Italy may provide some insight as to the ECtHR’s method.
Schalk’s importance focuses on the incorporation of same-sex
individuals into family life under Article 8. That significant shift
narrowed the margin of appreciation previously enjoyed by
Contracting States. Further, the wording portends its
willingness to find a positive obligation on States but failed to
provide what the criteria of such an obligation are.
In the two subsequent cases, the ECtHR offered further
insight. The Council of Europe finds itself in the same situation
post-Schalk as it did pre-Schalk – no positive obligation exists to
confer legal recognition to same-sex couples. However, the
ECtHR provided some recourse to same-sex couples. It
acknowledged that same-sex couples have an interest in
securing legal rights and partnership recognition and that
interest narrows the margin of appreciation to such an extent
that a State must include same-sex couples in an alternative
partnership scheme if it chooses to act.152 A clear majority of the
Contracting States Council of Europe have not created these
schemes but of the States that have, by a margin of 17-2, samesex couples were included.153 That, along with other
developments in the form of recommendations and resolutions,
provided enough factors for the ECtHR to place a positive
obligation on Contracting States who chose to create alternative
partnership schemes to do so with certain conditions.
The ECtHR presents States with two options: (1) if they
choose to provide legal recognition to non-married heterosexual
152 Vallianatos, 2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 90 (“[S]ame-sex couples would
have a particular interest in entering into a civil union since it would afford
them, unlike different-sex couples, the sole basis in … law on which to have
their relationship legally recognized”).
153 Id. ¶¶ 91–92.
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couples, they must also do so for same-sex couples; or (2) not
move at all on the issue and not run the risk of violating the
Convention. However, the concept of movement has been
expanded to include judicial intervention. The Fourth Section in
Oliari did not find a positive obligation because the legislature
failed to include same-sex couples, but because Italy’s judiciary
had identified an unconstitutional legal lacuna, the legislature
debated the issue for years and failed to act, and a clear majority
of Italian citizens favored such unions.154 In that regard, the
Fourth Section recognized that the Italian judiciary became the
arbiter on the issue, and it was their movement that created the
positive obligation.155 The point is that there was movement on
which the ECtHR could find a violation.
Greece finally addressed same-sex civil unions in 2015,
when it enacted a human rights bill extending civil unions to
same-sex couples.156 Not included in that legislation were
pension benefits, tax and health rights, and adoption rights.157
Although fairly limited, this may not violate the Convention.
The First Section held in Schalk, and has not subsequently
addressed this issue, that Contracting States continue to enjoy
a wide margin of appreciation on how these alternative
partnerships take form and the rights they confer.158 Schalk had
different circumstances than Oliari and Vallianatos, in that the
applicants in Schalk further claimed that the Austrian
partnership scheme was insufficient and inferior to the rights
enjoyed by heterosexual married couples.159 This situation did
not present itself in Oliari and Vallianatos.

Id. ¶ 176.
Id. ¶ 185.
156 Greece passes bill allowing civil partnerships for same-sex couples,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015
/dec/ 23/greece-passes-bill-allowing-same-sex-civil-partnerships.
157 Id.
158 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 109, (“On the whole, the Court does not see
any indication that the respondent State [Austria] exceeded its margin of
appreciation in tis choice of rights and obligations conferred by registered
partnership.”).
159 Id. ¶ 23.
154
155
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Italy fulfilled its obligation by passing civil unions for
same-sex couples on May 11, 2016.160 Although this provides
needed legal protections for same-sex couples, many LGB claim
that the legislation falls too short, in that it does not expand
marriage to same-sex couples and is woefully deficient in the
rights it confers (i.e., the right to adopt a partner’s children).161
While the original bill did provide broader protections, the
pushback from conservative elements of Italian society, namely
the Catholic Church, required the Government to pass a less
ambitious bill.162
Ultimately, the ECtHR signaled its willingness to
recognize a positive obligation for civil unions. It continues to
wait for a consensus to emerge that would allow it to find a
positive obligation to recognize same-sex unions. The probability
of that within the foreseeable future remains highly unlikely.
Many Contracting States of the European Union continue to
express disapproval of LGB individuals and their rights,
including same-sex marriage.163 Likely, that number increases
when one includes the Council of Europe. Thus, absent some
other development, the ECtHR is highly unlikely to find a
positive obligation to provide civil unions without any movement
or to find a consensus has emerged to extend marriage to samesex couples.
The ECtHR may seek to identify a consensus over the
types of rights conferred to same-sex couples. For instance, if a
majority of states were to include adoption, tax, or inheritance
rights in their civil union statutes, the ECtHR may find that a
160 Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Approves Same-Sex Civil Unions, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/world/europe/italygay-same-sex-unions.html?_r=0.
161 Id.
162 Sylvia Poggioli, A Holdout in Western Europe, Italy Prepares to Decide
on Civil Unions, NPR: PARALLELS (Jan. 28, 2016, 5:56 AM), http://www.
npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/27/464582046/a-holdout-in-western-europeitaly-prepares-to-decide-on-civil-unions; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Italian
senate passes watered-down bill recognizing same-sex civil unions, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2016, 2:48 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2016
/feb/25/italy-passes-watered-down-bill-recognising-same-sex-civil-unions.
163 Special Eurobarometer 437: Discrimination in the EU in 2015, report,
437, (Oct. 2015), https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/S2077_83_4_437
_ENG.
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State who does not extend these rights is in violation of the
Convention. However, the current situation does not lend itself
to any further substantial development on the issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Oliari provides more definition to which movement the
ECtHR may consider when confronted by an applicant seeking
legal partnership rights for same-sex couples. The ECtHR
expanded Vallianatos by including judicial action in conjunction
with national sentiment to determine whether the failure of the
Contracting State to provide partnership recognition violated
the Convention. While the ECtHR usually defers to a State’s
legislature to represent the consensus of the population, such as
in Italy, it will identify circumstances where legislature has
failed in that role. Nevertheless, it also implicitly indicated that
same-sex marriage advocates have a tremendous amount of
work to do before it will expand the purview of Article 12. But it
goes a step further, and makes it clear that even finding a broad
positive obligation under Article 8 for civil unions still requires
a lot of work. In that sense, the ECtHR demonstrated that,
although it may want to find in favor of same-sex civil rights,
concerns with implementation and legitimacy ultimately
prevail. Put another way, the conservative elements of the
Council of Europe bind the ECtHR. It will not act without
certainty when it comes to rights of same-sex couples. Oliari is
important, but for the wrong reasons.
From a pragmatic lens, Oliari functions as a step forward
on the issue. But it does not go far enough. If the ECtHR felt it
was necessary to limit its holding, it could have further clarified
which rights partnership recognition must encompass. Here,
same-sex couples remain unsure of the rights the State must
provide, if it chooses to act. Instead, the ECtHR will require more
action on the part of applicants to argue for each right as the
issue arises. Finally, the ECtHR leaves same-sex couples in
many Central and Eastern European states without any legal
protections, and continues to countenance state-sponsored
discrimination.
Ultimately, the ECtHR will likely do exactly what was
discussed above, but in an ad hoc fashion. Instead of addressing
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this aspect in one holding, it will likely require each individual
right to come before the ECtHR, thus allowing it to limit its
holding to more LGB-friendly States. In terms of a broad positive
obligation under Article 12, the ECtHR is nowhere in the realm
of imposing such a broad right on the Contracting States. It
remains much too concerned with the homophobic elements of
Eastern Europe.
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